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Abstract
When Congress first added sound recordings to the Copyright Act, it
acted prospectively only: sound recordings fixed on or after February 15,
1972, received federal statutory copyright protection, while sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, were left to the vagaries of state
law. This historic inequity was corrected in 2018 with enactment of the
Classics Protection and Access Act (CPA), which provides sui generis
protection to pre-1972 sound recordings that is similar, but not identical, to
federal copyright protection. But there is a subset of pre-1972 sound
recordings that already had federal copyright protection before the CPA was
enacted: namely, sound recordings of foreign origin that were granted
copyright under the umbrella of copyright “restoration” in the Uruguay
Round Amendments Act of 1994. This raises an obvious question that
Congress did not expressly address: is the new sui generis protection
provided by the CPA a substitute for the existing copyright protection that
such foreign sound recordings already enjoyed, or is it supplemental to the
existing copyright protection that such foreign sound recordings already
enjoyed, or does it simply not apply to such foreign sound recordings at all?
This article examines the three alternatives and concludes that
Congressional clarification is needed. Absent such clarification, it is
possible that foreign sound recordings are simply not covered by the CPA at
all, rendering its protections for digital music providers ineffective and
depriving foreign sound recordings of the term extension provided by the
CPA.
*

Copyright © 2022 by Tyler T. Ochoa. Permission to reproduce this article with
attribution to the author and with citation to this volume is granted according to the
Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License,
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode (last visited Dec. 15, 2019).
**
Professor, High Tech Law Institute, Santa Clara University School of Law. A.B.
1983, with distinction, J.D. 1987, with distinction, Stanford University. The author would
like to thank Professor Mark Janis for the invitation to participate in the virtual conference
celebrating the career of Professor Leaffer and to contribute an article to this symposium;
and the numerous participants at the conference and at WIPIP 2020 that provided helpful
feedback.

2022]

IP THEORY

This article is dedicated to Professor Marshall Leaffer: a
friend, a colleague in academia, a co-author on our
copyright casebook, and an inspiration to me throughout our
careers as law professors. It concerns the intersection of two
of our mutual subjects of interest and expertise: U.S.
copyright law, and international copyright and neighboring
rights protection.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Congress first added sound recordings to the Copyright Act, it
acted prospectively only: sound recordings fixed on or after February 15,
1972, received federal statutory copyright protection,1 while sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, were left to the vagaries of state
law.2 This historic inequity was corrected in 2018 with enactment of the
Classics Protection and Access Act (CPA),3 which provides sui generis
protection to pre-1972 sound recordings that is similar, but not identical, to
federal copyright protection.4
But there is a subset of pre-1972 sound recordings that already had
federal copyright protection before the CPA was enacted: namely, sound
recordings of foreign origin that were granted copyright under the umbrella
of copyright “restoration” in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
(URAA).5 This raises an obvious question that Congress did not expressly
address: is the new sui generis protection provided by the CPA a substitute
for the existing copyright protection that such foreign sound recordings
already enjoyed, or is it supplemental to the existing copyright protection
that such foreign sound recordings already enjoyed, or does it simply not
apply to such foreign sound recordings at all?
1

See Sound Recording Amendment Act, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391, 391
(1971). Section 3 provided that “This Act shall take effect four months after its enactment,”
or February 15, 1972; and that title 17, as amended, “shall apply only to sound recordings
fixed, published, and copyrighted on an after the effective date of this Act . . . and nothing
in title 17 . . . shall be applied retroactively or be construed as affecting in any way any
rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before the effective date of this Act.” Id. § 3,
85 Stat. at 392.
2
See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 13 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1578
(“The bill does not apply retroactively and . . . thus does not deal with recorded
performances already in existence. Instead[,] it leaves to pending or future litigation the
validity of state common law or statutes governing the unauthorized copying of existing
recordings.”).
3
Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, tit. II, §
201, 132 Stat. 3676, 3728 (2018).
4
See 17 U.S.C. §1401(a)(1) (2018). For an analysis of the protection provided by the CPA,
see Tyler Ochoa, An Analysis of Title II of Public Law 115-264: The Classics Protection
and Access Act (Guest Blog Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/10/an-analysis-of-title-ii-of-public-law-115264-the-classics-protection-and-access-act-guest-blog-post.htm [https://perma.cc/B2MHZW9H].
5
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. V, § 514(a), 108 Stat. 4809,
4976 (1994) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A) [hereinafter URAA]. The term
“restored work” is defined to include foreign sound recordings fixed before February 15,
1972, in 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C)(ii).
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Part II of this Article sets forth the history of copyright protection
for sound recordings in the United States, and neighboring rights protection
for sound recordings in other countries, prior to the URAA. Part III
examines the copyright restoration provisions of the URAA with regard to
foreign pre-1972 sound recordings. Part IV analyzes the Classics Protection
and Access Act that provided parallel sui generis federal protection to all
pre-1972 sound recordings, which shows that Congress simply did not
consider the potential overlap of such protection with the existing copyright
protection for foreign pre-1972 sound recordings at all. Part V discusses the
three possible resolutions to the issue, and Part VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND: LEGAL PROTECTION FOR SOUND RECORDINGS6
A. U.S. Copyright Law
U.S. copyright law distinguishes between a musical work (the notes
and words, in whatever form they occur) and a sound recording (a fixation
of any sounds, usually a particular recorded performance of a musical
work).7 The copyright in a musical work is owned initially by the composer
and the lyricist (as a work of joint authorship)8 and is usually assigned to a
music publisher.9 The copyright in a sound recording is owned in theory by
the performer(s) and the sound engineer(s),10 and in practice is usually
6

Readers are who are already familiar with the treatment of sound recordings under U.S.
copyright law and international neighboring rights may skip to Part III.
7
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) lists eight categories of “works of authorship” that are eligible
for copyright protection, including subsection (a)(2) (“musical works, including any
accompanying words”) and subsection (a)(7) (“sound recordings”). Section 101 defines
“sound recordings” as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or
other sounds, . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
8
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially
in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright
in the work.”); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A ‘joint work’ is a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”).
9
See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 220–
23 (Simon & Schuster 10th ed. 2019).
10
H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 4 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1569
(“performers, arrangers, and recording experts are needed to produce the finished creative
work in the form of a distinctive sound recording”); id. at 5, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1570
(“The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not always, involve
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assigned to the producer or record label.11 A sound recording is treated as a
“derivative work” of a preexisting musical work (even if they were created
simultaneously).12 Thus, there are two different copyrights, and two
different owners, both fixed in one master recording (a “phonorecord”
within the meaning of federal law).13
Musical works have expressly been eligible for federal statutory
copyright since 1831.14 At the time, of course, sound recordings did not
exist, so musical works were registered in the form of sheet music and were
protected only against unauthorized reproduction and sale.15 Congress did
not grant a public performance right in musical works until 1897.16
In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a piano roll (a roll of
perforated paper that caused a player piano to perform the notes of a
musical work) was not a “copy” of a musical work, and that making and
‘authorship’ both on the part of the performers whose performance is captured and on the
part of the record producer responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and
electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final
sound recording.”).
11
Id. at 5, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1570 (“[T]he [statute] does not fix the authorship, or the
resulting ownership, of sound recordings, but leaves these matters to the employment
relationship and bargaining among the interests involved.”); see PASSMAN, supra note 9, at
75–80.
12
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a musical arrangement, . . . sound recording, . . . or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”). See Mills Music, Inc. v.
Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 155, 165 (1985) (sound recordings of a “song” are derivative
works); Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.
2005) (“A sound recording is a derivative work in relation to the musical work recorded
therein . . . .”) (quoting M.B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.10[A]
n.8 (1991)).
13
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “phonorecords” as “material objects in which sounds,
other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed . . . .
The term ‘phonorecords’ includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed”).
14
See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (granting rights to “the author or
authors of any . . . musical composition”). Even before 1831, however, musical works in
the form of sheet music were protected as “books.” Bach v. Longman, 98 Eng. Rep. 1274
(K.B. 1777); Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907
(2005).
15
Cf. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 31 (1908) (“Congress has
dealt with the tangible thing, a copy of which is required to be filed with the Librarian of
Congress, and wherever the words are used (copy or copies) they seem to refer to the term
in its ordinary sense of indicating reproduction or duplication of the original.”); id. at 34
(defining “a copy of a musical composition” as “a written or printed record of it in
intelligible notation”).
16
Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
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selling piano rolls was therefore not an infringement.17 The following year,
Congress reversed that decision in the 1909 Copyright Act, granting to the
copyright owner of a musical work the exclusive right to make so-called
“mechanical reproductions” (what we now call “phonorecords”) of the
musical work.18 But the “mechanical reproductions” were not themselves
eligible for federal statutory copyright.19 That meant that if there was an
unauthorized reproduction of such a recording, the musical work copyright
owner could sue (if the work was registered under federal copyright law),
but the owner of the master recording (the producer or record label) could
not recover damages under federal law for such a use.
In the absence of federal copyright protection, producers of sound
recordings turned to state law—both statutory and common law—for
protection against record piracy (commercial duplication of phonograph
records onto cassette tapes for sale).20 In Goldstein v. California,21 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that such state laws were valid and were not preempted
by federal law. In the meantime, however, Congress had enacted the Sound
Recording Amendment Act of 1971,22 which, as noted above, made sound
recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972, eligible for federal statutory
copyright.23 Federal copyright protection for 1972-and-later sound
recordings was carried forward in the 1976 Copyright Act.24 Congress also
ratified the Goldstein decision in section 301(c) of the 1976 Act, which
stated: “With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972,
17

White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 37–38.
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 25(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1081–82. Congress then
mitigated the potential anti-competitive effects of that choice by creating a compulsory
license: once the copyright owner had permitted the use of its music to make a “mechanical
reproduction,” any other person could make a different “mechanical reproduction” without
permission by notifying the copyright owner and paying a statutory royalty of two cents per
copy. Id. § 1(e), 35 Stat. at 1075–76. See Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First
Compulsory License, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 217–21 (2010).
19
Capitol Recs., Inc. v. Mercury Recs. Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 659–62 (2d Cir. 1955).
20
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (as enacted in 1968); CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2);
Mercury Records, 221 F.2d at 662–63 (New York common law). The Erie prediction in
Mercury Records was confirmed in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 830
N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
21
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
22
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, §1(a), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (limiting the
reproduction of copyrighted sound recordings).
23
See supra text accompanying note 1.
24
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, §102(a)(7), 90 Stat. 2541, 2545);
but see former 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 301(c), 90 Stat. 2541,
2572) (“no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright
under this title”).
18
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any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall
not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2047.”25 The
sunset date was later extended to February 15, 2067, by the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.26
When sound recordings were added to the federal copyright act in
1972, however, Congress gave them less protection than that provided to
other kinds of copyrighted works. Authors of most copyrightable works
receive five exclusive rights: the right to reproduce the work, to prepare
derivative works based on the work, to publicly distribute copies of the
work, to publicly perform the work, and to publicly display the work.27 But
broadcasters had enough lobbying power to block any action in Congress if
it required them to pay more royalties.28 As a result, Congress did not give
sound recording copyright owners an exclusive right of public
performance.29 Moreover, the reproduction and adaptation rights are limited
to duplication or electronic manipulation of the actual fixed sounds.30
Unlike every other kind of copyrighted work, sound recordings are not
protected against imitation or simulation; instead, sound-alike recordings
are expressly permitted.31
Sound recording copyright owners were never happy with the
legislative compromise that excluded them from a public performance right.
25

17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1976) (enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, §301(c), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572).
Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(a), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (amending
statute to extend copyright term).
27
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018) (enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541). As enacted,
section 106 did not include clause (6); that subsection was added in 1995. Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109 Stat.
336, 337.
28
See KEVIN PARKS, MUSIC & COPYRIGHT IN AMERICA: TOWARD THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX
157 (ABA 2012).
29
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1976) (enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, §114(a), 90 Stat. 2541,
2560) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are limited to
rights specified by clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106, and do not include any right of
performance under section 106(4).”). The policy argument was that radio airplay served as
free advertising for the sale of phonograph records. PARKS, supra note 28, at 157.
30
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2018) (limiting the reproduction right “to the right to duplicate
the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly
recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording”; and limiting the adaptation right “to the
right to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording
are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality”).
31
See id. (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording . . . do not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in
the copyrighted sound recording.”).
26
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In 1995, however, with digital broadcasting on the horizon, Congress
enacted another compromise, granting to sound recording copyright owners
the exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.”32 But this right was accompanied with further
limitations: FCC-licensed broadcast transmissions are exempt,33 and
subscription services (such as satellite radio) and other non-interactive
streaming services get the benefit of a compulsory license.34 Only
interactive services, such as Spotify, must obtain negotiated licenses from
sound recording copyright owners.35
Thus, in 1994, when the United States was negotiating the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), as part of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade,36 the United States did not yet have any type of public
performance right for sound recordings. But because the United States
exports more sound recordings than it imports, it had an economic interest
in encouraging other countries to adopt strong legal protection for sound
recordings. Thus, in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), the U.S.
decided to grant copyrights to foreign pre-1972 sound recordings for the
first time, under the guise of copyright “restoration,” in the hopes that other
countries would reciprocate.37
B. International Protection for Sound Recordings
The U.S. joined the Berne Convention, the major international treaty
concerning copyright, effective March 1, 1989.38 But the Berne Convention
does not require member nations to provide copyright protection to sound
recordings because, with the prominent exception of Anglo-American
countries, most countries do not recognize “copyright” or “author’s rights,”
32

17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2018).
See id. § 114(d)(1).
34
See id. § 114(d)(2).
35
See id. § 114(d)(3).
36
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement],
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/31bis_trips_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A22Y68XE] (as amended on Jan. 23, 2017).
37
See infra Part III.
38
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986)
[hereinafter Berne Convention], https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/283698
[https://perma.cc/7QGX-WNQS] (last visited July 17, 2022).
33
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as such, in sound recordings.39 Instead, rights in sound recordings, or
“phonograms” in international parlance,40 are treated separately under a
regime of so-called “neighboring rights.”41
The international agreements governing neighboring rights provide
legal protection to performers and to producers of phonograms (as well as
broadcasting organizations), but they do not provide any rights to sound
engineers.42 For example, the Rome Convention requires member states to
give performers the right to prevent the broadcasting or communication to
the public of their unfixed performances, the fixation of their unfixed
performances, and the reproduction of their fixed performances.43 It also
requires member states to give producers of phonograms “the right to
authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms,”44 and the right (shared with performers) to receive a single
equitable remuneration for the broadcasting or communication to the public
of their phonograms.45 These rights must last at least twenty years after the
end of the year in which performance, fixation, or broadcast occurs.46

39

See SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND §19.01 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d
ed. 2006); Capitol Recs., Inc. v. Naxos of Am, Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 479 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“[N]either the Berne Convention nor the U.C.C. [Universal Copyright Convention] applies
to sound recordings.”).
40
A “phonogram” is defined as “any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance
or of other sounds.” Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms art. 1(a), Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309,
T.I.A.S. 7808, 866 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter Geneva Phonograms Convention],
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/288582 [https://perma.cc/79LV-BQ64] (last visited July
17, 2022).
41
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 39, at §19.01.
42
The implicit assumption is that sound engineers are employees of the producers of phonograms and that the producers own the rights, either as works made for hire or by
assignment.
43
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organizations art. 7(1), Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Rome
Convention], https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/289757 [https://perma.cc/ZEK7-2XD2]. The
Rome Convention defines “performers” as “actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other
persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic
works.” Id. art. 3(a).
44
Id. art. 10.
45
Id. art. 12.
46
Id. art. 14.
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Because the United States still lacks a general public performance
right for sound recordings, it is not a member of the Rome Convention.47
The United States is, however, a member of the Geneva Phonograms
Convention, which requires member states to give producers of phonograms
the right to prevent the making, importation, and distribution of
“duplicates” (i.e., reproductions) of their phonograms,48 which rights must
also last for at least twenty years from the end of the year in which the
phonogram was first fixed or first published.49
Concurrently with the URAA, the United States became a member
of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires member states to give performers
the right to prevent the fixation of their unfixed performances, any
reproduction of such fixation, and the broadcasting or communication to the
public of their live performances;50 and to give producers of phonograms
“the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their
phonograms.”51 These rights must last at least fifty years from the end of
the calendar year in which the fixation or performance took place.52 The
TRIPS Agreement also requires member states to grant broadcasting
organizations the right to prohibit any fixation of their broadcasts, any
reproductions of those fixations, and the communication to the public of
television broadcasts of those fixations.53 Those rights must last for at least
twenty years from the end of the calendar year in which the broadcast took
place.54
47

As of January 1, 2022, there are 96 member states of the Rome Convention, including
Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and all EU member nations except Malta. See
WIPO, International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations: Status on September 15, 2020,
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/rome.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5UW-CWK6].
48
Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 40, art. 2. A “duplicate” is defined as “an
article which contains sounds taken directly or indirectly from a phonogram and which
embodies all or a substantial part of the sounds fixed in that phonogram.” Id. art. 1(c). Cf.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “phonorecords” as “material objects in which sounds . . .
are fixed . . . includ[ing] the material object in which the sounds are first fixed”).
49
Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 40, art. 4.
50
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, art. 14(1).
51
Id. art. 14(2).
52
Id. art. 14(5).
53
Id. art. 14(3). In the alternative, a member state may grant a copyright in the subject
matter of the broadcast, if it provides the same minimum protection. Id. The limitation of
the public communication right to television broadcasts undoubtedly was to accommodate
the United States, which requires consent of the sound recording copyright owner to
reproduce a sound recording as part of a television broadcast (a so-called “synch” license),
but does not grant a sound recording copyright owner a general public performance right.
54
Id. art. 14(5).
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Shortly after the URAA the United States negotiated and joined the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT),55 which requires
member states to grant performers five exclusive rights: the right to prevent
the unauthorized fixation, broadcasting, or communication to the public of
their unfixed performances;56 the reproduction of their fixed
performances;57 the public distribution of copies of their fixed
performances;58 the commercial rental of copies of their fixed
performances;59 and the right of making their fixed performances available
to the public (e.g., by streaming).60 These rights must last at least fifty years
from the end of the year in which the performances was fixed.61 The WPPT
also requires member states to grant producers of phonograms the exclusive
rights of reproduction,62 public distribution,63 commercial rental,64 and
making available of their phonograms to the public.65 These rights must last
for the longer of fifty years from the end of the year in which the
phonogram was fixed, or fifty years from the end of the year in which the
phonogram was published.66 Finally, the WPPT grants a toothless right,
requiring that both performers and producers “shall enjoy . . . a single
equitable remuneration” for the broadcasting or communication to the
public of their published sound recordings,67 but expressly allowing
member countries to “not apply these provisions at all.”68

55

WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203, 36
I.L.M. 76, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT],
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/295578 [https://perma.cc/7BZY-J7W5].
56
Id. art. 6.
57
Id. art. 7.
58
Id. art. 8(1). The public distribution right is subject to the first-sale doctrine, also known
as the doctrine of exhaustion. Id. art. 8(2).
59
Id. art. 9(1). If commercial rental does not “giv[e] rise to the material impairment” of the
reproduction right, a country may maintain “a system of equitable remuneration” instead, if
it had adopted such a system prior to April 15, 1994. Id. art. 9(2).
60
Id. art. 10.
61
Id. art. 17(1).
62
Id. art. 11.
63
Id. art. 12(1). As with performers, the public distribution right is subject to the first-sale
doctrine, also known as the doctrine of exhaustion. Id. art. 12(2).
64
Id. art. 13(1). As with performers, a country may maintain “a system of equitable
remuneration” instead, if it had adopted such a system prior to April 15, 1994, so long as
the commercial rental does not “giv[e] rise to the material impairment” of the reproduction
right. Id. art. 13(2).
65
Id. art. 11.
66
Id. art. 17(2).
67
Id. art. 15(1).
68
Id. art. 15(3).
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III. COPYRIGHT RESTORATION FOR FOREIGN PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS
A. The Statutory Requirements
Article 18 of the Berne Convention requires countries to protect “all
works which, at the moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen
into the public domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the
term of protection.”69 If the term of protection in the source country has
expired, however, “that work shall not be protected anew.”70 Member
countries are given a great deal of discretion to decide how to implement
this principle.71
When the United States joined the Berne Convention, effective
March 1, 1989,72 it made no effort to implement Article 18. To the contrary,
the Berne Convention Implementation Act expressly made it clear that the
Berne Convention was not self-executing, and that foreign works could
claim protection only on the basis of domestic law.73 To drive the point
home, Congress added the following language to section 104 of the
Copyright Act:
No right or interest in a work eligible for protection under
this title may be claimed by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the
provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the
United States thereto. Any rights in a work eligible for
protection under this title that derive from this title, other
Federal or State statutes, or the common law, shall not be
expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the

69

Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 18(1).
Id. art. 18(2).
71
Id. art. 18(3) (“The application of this principle shall be subject to any provisions
contained in special conventions to that effect existing or to be concluded between
countries of the Union. In the absence of such provisions, the respective countries shall
determine, each in so far as it is concerned, the conditions of application of this
principle.”) (emphasis added). See generally Daniel Gervais, Golan v. Holder: A Look at
the Constraints Imposed by the Berne Convention, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 147 (2011).
72
See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §13(a), 102
Stat. 2853, 2861 (modifying U.S. copyright law in line with the Berne Convention); Berne
Convention and “Berne Implementation Act of 1988”, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,748 (Dec. 2, 1988)
(specifying the date of entry into force).
73
See id. § 2(a), 102 Stat. at 2853.
70
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provisions of the Berne Convention, or the adherence of the
United States thereto.74

Five years later, however, the United States and other nations signed
agreements creating the World Trade Organization (WTO), including the
TRIPS Agreement.75 The TRIPS Agreement made all of the provisions of
the Berne Convention (except for Article 6bis on moral rights) enforceable
between nations through the dispute resolution procedures of the World
Trade Organization.76 Consequently, to avoid violating the TRIPS
Agreement, and to encourage other nations to provide reciprocal protection
to U.S. works, the United States decided to “implement” Article 18 in the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).77
Section 514 of the URAA “restored” the copyright in works of
foreign origin that had entered the public domain in the United States but
were still under copyright in their source countries. As codified in section
104A of the Copyright Act, it provides: “Copyright subsists, in accordance
with this section, in restored works, and vests automatically on the date of
restoration.”78 After some confusion, Congress clarified that for works from
WTO member nations, the “date of restoration” was January 1, 1996.79 In
Golan v. Holder,80 the U.S. Supreme Court held that granting copyright
protection to works that were in the public domain in the United States (socalled copyright “restoration”) did not violate either the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution or the First Amendment.81

74

See id. § 4(a)(3), 102 Stat. at 2855 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104(c)).
See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
76
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, art. 9(1) (“Members shall comply with Articles 1
through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members
shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred
under Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”); id. art. 64 (“The
provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the
Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to . . . the settlement of disputes under this
Agreement . . . .”).
77
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A).
78
17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1) (2018).
79
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(2)(A) (2018).
80
565 U.S. 302 (2012).
81
Id. at 308, 327 (Copyright Clause), 327–29 (First Amendment). See generally Tyler T.
Ochoa, Is the Public Domain Irrevocable? An Introduction to Golan v. Holder, 64 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 123 (2011); Howard B. Abrams, Eldred, Golan and Their Aftermath, 60
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 491 (2013).
75
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A “restored work” must satisfy all of the following four elements:
First, the work must have “at least one author or rightholder who was, at the
time the work was created, a national or domiciliary of an eligible
country.”82 (An “eligible country” is a country with whom the United States
has copyright relations, either because it is a member of the Berne
Convention or the WTO, it adheres to the WIPO Copyright Treaty or the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, or by Presidential
proclamation.83) Second, if the work is published, it must have been “first
published in an eligible country and not published in the United States
during the 30-day period following [such] publication.”84 Third, the work
must not be “in the public domain in its source country through expiration
of term of protection.”85 Fourth, the work must have been “in the public
domain in the United States” for one of the following three reasons: “(i)
noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by United States
copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure
to comply with any manufacturing requirements; (ii) lack of subject matter
protection in the case of sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972;
or (iii) lack of national eligibility.”86
Consequently, on January 1, 1996, all sound recordings fixed before
February 15, 1972, that satisfied the first three elements were granted a
federal statutory copyright in the United States for the first time.87 Note that
this provision went far beyond anything required by the Berne Convention,
which does not apply to sound recordings at all.88 Instead, the United States
hoped that granting copyright retroactively to foreign sound recordings
would encourage foreign nations to reciprocate by granting legal protection
retroactively to U.S. sound recordings.
82

17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(D) (2018).
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(3) (2018). “[I]f the source country for the work is an eligible
country solely by virtue of its adherence to the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty,” then the work must be a sound recording. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(E) (2018). That
restriction was added by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §102(c)(3)(C), 112 Stat. 2860, 2862
(1998).
84
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(D) (2018). The Berne Convention provides that “A work shall
be considered as having been published simultaneously in several countries if it has been
published in two or more countries within thirty days of its first publication.” Berne
Convention, supra note 38, art. 3(4).
85
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B) (2018).
86
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(C) (2018).
87
Although section 104A refers to these as “restored copyrights” and “restored works,” no
sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, had previously been eligible for a federal
statutory copyright, so these works were receiving copyright protection for the first time.
88
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
83
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B. Applying the Statutory Requirements

In assessing how many sound recordings received a federal statutory
copyright in this manner, a few comments on each of the elements is in
order. First, a “restored work” must have “at least one author or rightholder
who was, at the time the work was created, a national or domiciliary of an
eligible country.”89 The term “rightholder” is defined as “the person[] (A)
who, with respect to a sound recording, first fixes a sound recording with
authorization, or (B) who has acquired rights from the person described in
subparagraph (A) by means of any conveyance or by operation of law.”90
The definition is intentionally vague: it does not specify who “the person
who first fixes a sound recording” is.91 Is it the performers who perform on
the recording? Is it the sound engineers who set up the microphones, adjust
the mixing board, and press the “record” button? Is it the producer who
hires and pays the performers and sound engineers, either as employees or
as independent contractors? Moreover, the definition does not specify the
persons whose “authorization” the initial rightholder must have. Does it
simply mean that the initial rightholder has the authorization of the
copyright owner of any underlying musical or literary work? Or does it
mean that the initial rightholder must (also) have the authorization of all
other persons who contributed to the recording (the performers and sound
engineers)?
Fortunately, international law gives us a clue as the meaning of the
term “rightholder.” § 104A specifies that “[a] restored work vests initially
in the author or initial rightholder of the work as determined by the law of
the source country of the work.”92 Since the “source country” cannot be the
United States,93 we must look to foreign law to determine who the “author
or initial rightholder” of a sound recording is. And since most foreign
countries reserve the term “author” for copyright-eligible works, and treat
sound recordings (or “phonograms”) only under so-called “neighboring
rights,”94 we must look to neighboring rights treaties to elicit the meaning of
the term “initial rightholder.”

89

17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(D) (2018).
Id. § 104A(h)(7).
91
Id.
92
Id. § 104A(b) (emphasis added).
93
Id. § 104A(h)(8) (“The ‘source country’ of a restored work is[] (A) a nation other than
the United States . . . .”). There are different rules for determining the “source country” of a
restored work, depending on whether the work is published or unpublished. Id.
94
See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
90
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Both the Rome Convention and the Geneva Phonograms
Convention define a “producer of phonograms” as “the person who, or the
legal entity which, first fixes the sounds of a performance or other
sounds.”95 The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty defines the
“producer of a phonogram” as “the person, or the legal entity, who or which
takes the initiative and has the responsibility for the first fixation of the
sounds of a performance or other sounds.”96 Using the transitive property of
grammar, one can infer that, in most foreign countries, the “initial
rightholder” is the producer of the phonogram (rather than the performers
or the sound engineers). Moreover, the Rome Convention, the WPPT, and
the TRIPS Agreement all require that performers be granted the right to
authorize the first fixation of their performances. Therefore, one can infer
that, in most foreign countries, the producer who “first fixes a sound
recording” must obtain the “authorization” of the performer(s), in addition
to the authorization of the copyright owner of the musical or literary work
being performed.
Second, if the work is published, it must have been “first published
in an eligible country and not published in the United States during the 30day period following [such] publication.”97 Under the 1976 Act, a sound
recording is “published” when “phonorecords” of it are distributed “to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending.”98 Thus, the initial release date of a sound recording is the date of
first publication.
The source of the second limitation is Article 3 of the Berne
Convention, which extends protection not only to works of “authors who
are nationals of one of the countries of the Union,”99 but also to “works first
published in one of those countries, or simultaneously in a country outside
95

Rome Convention, supra note 43, art. 3(c); Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note
40, art. 1(b).
96
WPPT, supra note 55, art. 2(d).
97
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(D) (2018). The Berne Convention provides that “[a] work shall
be considered as having been published simultaneously in several countries if it has been
published in two or more countries within thirty days of its first publication.” Berne
Convention, supra note 38, art. 3(4).
98
Id. § 101 (definition of “publication”). See also Rome Convention, supra note 43, art.
3(d) (defining “publication as “the offering of copies of a phonogram to the public in
reasonable quantity”). For historical reasons that are not germane here, the United States
distinguishes between “copies” of a work (material objects in which a work is fixed) and
“phonorecords” of a sound recording (material objects in which only sounds are fixed). 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (definition of “copies”).
99
Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 3(1)(a).
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the Union and in a country of the Union.”100 The Berne Convention further
provides that “[a] work shall be considered as having been published
simultaneously in several countries if it has been published in two or more
countries within thirty days of its first publication.”101 The Rome
Convention has the same definition for “simultaneous publication” of
phonograms.102 Thus, if a sound recording was first “published” in the
United States, or if it was “simultaneously” published in the United States
and another country, then the sound recording is not eligible for copyright
restoration. (Note that many sound recordings were released simultaneously
in both the United States and Canada, so this limitation disqualifies those
recordings from copyright restoration.)
Third, on the date of restoration, the work must not have been “in
the public domain in its source country through expiration of term of
protection.”103 The “source country” for a restored work depends on
whether the work was published or unpublished (presumably on the date of
restoration). If the sound recording was unpublished on that date, the
“source country” is the eligible country in which the rightholder was a
national or domiciliary, or in which the majority of the foreign rightholders
were nationals or domiciliaries.104 If the majority of rightholders were not
foreign, then the “source country” is “the nation other than the United States
which has the most significant contacts with the work.”105 If the sound
recording was published on the date of restoration, then the “source
country” is “the eligible country in which the work [was] first published”;106
but, “if [it was] published on the same day in 2 or more eligible countries,
the eligible country which has the most significant contacts with the work”
is the “source country.”107
Once the “source country” of a sound recording has been identified,
one must determine whether its term of protection was still in effect on the
100

Id. art. 3(1)(b).
Id. art. 3(4).
102
Rome Convention, supra note 43, art. 5(2) (“If a phonogram was first published in a
non-contracting State but if it was also published, within thirty days of its first publication,
in a Contracting State (simultaneous publication), it shall be considered as first published in
the Contracting State.”). The United States rejects this definition: if a sound recording was
published simultaneously in the United States (a non-contracting State) and in another
country, then the sound recording is considered a “United States work,” see 17 U.S.C. §
101 (2018), defining “United States work”, and it is not eligible for copyright restoration.
103
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B) (2018).
104
Id. § 104A(h)(8)(B)(i).
105
Id. § 104A(h)(8)(B)(ii).
106
Id. § 104A(h)(8)(C)(i).
107
Id. § 104A(h)(8)(C)(ii).
101
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date of restoration (January 1, 1996). As noted above,108 however, both the
Rome Convention and the Geneva Phonograms Convention only require
twenty years of protection from the end of the year in which the sound
recording was fixed or first published.109 For sound recordings whose
“source country” had a twenty-year term, the term of protection for all pre1972 sound recordings would have expired before the date of restoration, so
this condition would not have been satisfied.110
Before 1996, however, the EU had adopted a uniform term of
protection for sound recordings (phonograms) of fifty years from the date of
fixation;111 and “if the phonogram [was] lawfully published or lawfully
communicated to the public during this period,” the term was fifty years
from the earlier of the date of first publication or the date of first public
communication.112 Thus, sound recordings whose “source country” was in
the EU (or another eligible country that had a similar term) and that were
fixed on or after January 1, 1946, and before February 15, 1972, were
granted a U.S. copyright as a “restored work.” In addition, sound recordings
that were first published or communicated to the public in such countries on
or after January 1, 1946, and before February 15, 1972, were granted a U.S.
copyright as a “restored work,” so long as that publication or
communication occurred within fifty years of its first fixation.
It is impossible to say how many sound recordings meet all of these
conditions, in part because it is difficult to determine exact release dates in
various countries (to comply with the condition that a recording not be
simultaneously released in the United States); but there are a number of
prominent examples. Several early sound recordings by the Beatles appear
to be “restored works,” including I Saw Her Standing There,113 Twist and

108

See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
Rome Convention, supra note 43, art. 14; Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note
40, art. 4.
110
The exception is that a foreign sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, but that
was first published on or after January 1, 1976, would still be eligible for copyright
restoration.
111
Council Directive 93/98/EEC of Oct. 29, 1993, Harmonizing the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 3(2), 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9, 11–12 (EU).
112
Id.
113
I Saw Her Standing There was released in the United Kingdom on March 22, 1963, but
it was not released in the United States until December 26, 1963. I Saw Her Standing
There, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Saw_Her_Standing_There
[https://perma.cc/Q932-79WN].
109
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Shout,114 All My Loving,115 and Please Mr. Postman.116 (Most subsequent
Beatles singles and albums, however, were released in the United States
within thirty days of their release in the United Kingdom, making them
ineligible to be “restored works.”) Most of the tracks on two albums by the
Rolling Stones, The Rolling Stones117 and Aftermath,118 appear to be
restored works. (Again, however, most of the subsequent Rolling Stones
albums were released in the United States within thirty days of their release
in the United Kingdom.) Edith Piaf’s original recording of her signature
song La Vie en Rose appears to be a restored work.119 Also, a large number
of classical music recordings first released in Europe by labels such as
Deutsche Grammophon, Philips, EMI, and Melodiya are likely restored
works.120
C. Duration of Copyright for Restored Pre-1972 Sound Recordings
The Beatles’ recording of Twist and Shout was released in the United Kingdom on
March 22, 1963, but it was not released in the United States until March 2, 1964. Twist and
Shout, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twist_and_Shout#The_Beatles'_version
[https://perma.cc/J5FU-2VDT].
115
All My Loving was released in the United Kingdom on November 22, 1963, but it was
not released in the United States until January 20, 1964. All My Loving, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_My_Loving [https://perma.cc/DT7J-J8HH].
116
The Beatles’ recording of Please Mr. Postman was released in the United Kingdom on
November 22, 1963, but it was not released in the United States until April 10,
1964. Please Mr. Postman, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Please_Mr._Postman#The_Beatles_version
[https://perma.cc/27B3-26VV]. The Beatles’ recording of Roll Over Beethoven has the
same release dates. Roll Over Beethoven, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roll_Over_Beethoven#The_Beatles [https://perma.cc/ML7CGLVJ].
117
The Rolling Stones was released in the United Kingdom on April 16, 1964, but it was
not released in the United States (under the title England’s Newest Hit Makers) until May
30, 1964, with one track deleted and another track substituted. The Rolling Stones (Album),
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Rolling_Stones_(album)
[https://perma.cc/N8E2-LGZ2].
118
Aftermath was released in the United Kingdom on April 15, 1966, but it was not
released in the United States until July 2, 1966, with four tracks deleted and one track
added. Aftermath (Rolling Stones Album), WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aftermath_(Rolling_Stones_album) [https://perma.cc/6YDHTLFZ].
119
Piaf first recorded La Vie en Rose on January 4, 1947, and Columbia Records first
released it in France in February 1947; but it had not yet been released in the United States
when she began her U.S. concert tour in October 1947. La Vie En Rose (Lied), WIKIPEDIA,
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_vie_en_rose_(Lied) [https://perma.cc/T3NX-VG5J].
120
For example, Nina Dorliac-Richter, the widow of pianist Sviatoslav Richter, filed a
Notice of Intent to Enforce Restored Copyrights for literally hundreds of Richter’s sound
recordings. See Copyright Restoration of Works in Accordance with the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 19,288, 19,297–99 (Apr. 17, 1998).
114
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The term of protection for restored works is “the remainder of the
term that the work would have otherwise been granted in the United States
if the work never entered the public domain in the United States.”121 In
1996, sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, and published
before 1978 were entitled to an initial term of twenty-eight years and a
renewal term of forty-seven years, for a total of seventy-five years from first
publication.122 Sound recordings that were fixed before February 15, 1972,
but that remained unpublished through the end of 1977 were entitled to the
same term as works fixed on or after January 1, 1978; and if such works
were published before the end of 2002, they were entitled to a minimum
term at least through the end of 2027.123 Assuming most such sound
recordings were works made for hire, the term was seventy-five years from
the date of first publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expired
earlier.124
In 1998, two years after the initial date of restoration, Congress
extended the terms of all existing copyrights by twenty years.125 As none of
the initial terms had expired for any restored foreign sound recordings, all
such recordings benefitted from the 1998 term extension. Thus, the term of
protection for most pre-1972 sound recordings that qualified as “restored
works” is now ninety-five years from first publication.126 If the recording
remained unpublished on January 1, 1978, however, the term is either the
shorter of ninety-five years from first publication or 120 years from fixation
(if the sound recording is a work made for hire),127 or life of the longest
surviving author plus seventy years (if the sound recording is not a work
made for hire).128 In either case, if the foreign pre-1972 sound recording

121

17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B) (2018).
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1996) (copyrights in their first term on January 1, 1978); 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(b) (1996) (copyrights in renewal term or renewed before January 1, 1978).
123
Id. § 303.
124
Id. § 302(c).
125
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301–04).
126
17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2018) (copyrights in their first term on January 1, 1978); id. §
304(b) (copyrights in renewal term on or renewed before January 1, 1978); id. § 303(a)
(sound recordings that remained unpublished on January 1, 1978); id. § 302(c) (previously
unpublished sound recordings that were works made for hire and were subsequently
published).
127
Id. § 303(a); id. § 302(c).
128
Id. § 303(a); id. § 302(b).
122
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was first published in 1978–2002, then the copyright term is subject to a
statutory minimum term, until at least December 31, 2047.129

IV. SUI GENERIS PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS
In 1995, Congress granted an exclusive right to publicly perform a
copyrighted sound recording by means of digital audio transmission.130 That
right, however, applied only to sound recordings fixed on or after February
15, 1972, plus those foreign sound recordings fixed before that date that
qualified for restored copyrights. Domestic sound recordings fixed before
February 15, 1972, did not qualify because they were protected only by
state law.131
Only one state, California, expressly protected pre-1972 sound
recordings by statute.132 Other states provided common-law protection to
pre-1972 sound recordings.133 By common consensus, however, state law
did not grant public performance rights to sound recordings.134 As
streaming became a more prominent means of exploiting sound recordings,
that discrepancy between federal and state protection started to become
more problematic.
In August 2013, Flo & Eddie, Inc., a corporation that owns the
rights in sound recordings by the 1960s band “The Turtles,” began a
129

Id. § 303(a).
Id. § 106(6).
131
See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 13 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1578
(“The bill does not apply retroactively and . . . thus does not deal with recorded
performances already in existence. Instead[,] it leaves to pending or future litigation the
validity of state common law or statutes governing the unauthorized copying of existing
recordings.”).
132
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 980(a)(2) (West 2022) (“The author of . . . a sound recording
initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972, has an exclusive ownership therein until February
15, 2047, as against all persons except one who independently makes . . . an independent
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds contained
in the prior sound recording.”).
133
See, e.g., Capitol Recs., Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
134
See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936, 944 (N.Y. 2016)
(“[C]ommon-law copyright of sound recordings consists only in the power to prevent
others from reproducing the copyrighted work; that limited right does not include control
over other rights in the work, such as public performance. Since the 1940s, the recording
and broadcasting industries appear to have acted in conformity with that premise, as
evidenced by the apparent absence of any attempt by sound recording copyright owners to
assert control over the right of public performance.”) (emphasis added by the court)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
130
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quixotic campaign to seek royalties under state law for digital transmissions
of pre-1972 sound recordings. I have described the history of that effort in
more detail elsewhere.135 Although Flo & Eddie ultimately were
unsuccessful in getting any court to recognize public performance rights
under state law,136 the attention that their campaign brought to the issue
prompted Congress to act. On October 11, 2018, the Classics Protection and
Access Act (CPA) was signed into law, as Title II of the Orrin G. HatchBob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act of 2018.137
The CPA enacted 17 U.S.C. § 1401, which provides:
Anyone who, on or before the last day of the applicable
transition period under paragraph (2), and without the
consent of the rights owner, engages in covered activity with
respect to a sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972,
shall be subject to the remedies provided . . . to the same
extent as an infringer of copyright . . . .138
“Covered activity” is defined as “any activity that the copyright
owner of a sound recording would have the exclusive right to do or
authorize under section 106 or 602, . . . if the sound recording were fixed on
or after February 15, 1972.”139 Thus, the copyright owner of a pre-1972
sound recording effectively now has the exclusive rights of reproduction,
adaptation, and distribution, and public performance by means of digital
audio transmission,140 as well as the exclusive right to import or export
unlawful copies.141
See Tyler Ochoa, A Seismic Ruling Undone: California’s Sound Recording Copyright
Statute Does Not Include Public Performance Rights—Flo & Eddie v. Sirius XM (Guest
Blog Post), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2021),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2021/08/a-seismic-ruling-undone-californias-soundrecording-copyright-statute-does-not-include-public-performance-rights-flo-eddie-v-siriusxm.htm [https://perma.cc/M2WK-SXZ8].
136
See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936 (N.Y. 2016); Flo &
Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 229 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 2017); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 9 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2021) (applying California law).
137
Orrin G. Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, § 201,
132 Stat. 3676, 3728.
138
17 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (2018).
139
Id. § 1401(l)(1).
140
Id. § 106(1), (2), (3), (6). Sound recordings lack a general public performance right or a
public display right. Id. § 106(4), (5).
141
Id. § 602(a)(1)–(2). See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Rsch. Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135 (1998) (section 602 is subject to the first-sale doctrine codified in section 109);
135
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The term of protection provided to pre-1972 sound recordings is
ninety-five years from the date of first publication (the maximum term
allowed to pre-1978 works under existing copyright law), plus a “transition
period” of between three and fifteen years.142 The “transition period” is
three years after the date of enactment for sound recordings published
before 1923;143 five years for sound recordings first published in 1923–
1946;144 and fifteen years for sound recordings first published in 1947–
1956.145 All other sound recordings get a transition period that expires on
February 15, 2067.146 As with other copyrighted works, all terms are
extended to December 31 of the year in which they otherwise would expire;
except that no protection is provided to pre-1972 sound recordings after
February 15, 2067.147
Thus, sound recordings first published before 1923 entered the
public domain on January 1, 2022.148 Sound recordings first published
between 1923 and 1946 get 100 years of protection. Sound recordings first
published between 1947 and 1956 get 110 years of protection. Sound
recordings first published between 1957 and 1972 are protected until
February 15, 2067, resulting in a variable terms of protection of between
110 years and 95 years. Finally, sound recordings that remained
unpublished on February 15, 1972, are protected until February 15, 2067
(even if they were published by the rights owner in the meantime).

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (for purposes of the first-sale
doctrine, copies “lawfully made under this title” include copies manufactured abroad, as
long as they were made “in compliance with” the U.S. Copyright Act).
142
17 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(2)(A) (2018).
143
Id. § 1401(a)(2)(B)(i). “Publication” is defined as “the distribution of copies or
phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending.” Id. § 101 (definition of “publication”); see also id. § 1401(f)(6) (“Any
term used in this section that is defined in section 101 shall have the meaning given that
term in section 101.”).
144
Id. § 1401(a)(2)(B)(ii).
145
Id. § 1401(a)(2)(B)(iii).
146
Id. § 1401(a)(2)(B)(iv).
147
Id. § 1401(a)(2)(A).
148
The Association for Recorded Sound Collections (ARSC) reports that an estimated
400,000 recordings entered the public domain on January 1, 2022. (From that universe, a
panel of seven experts nominated over 60 historical recordings and selected 10 as the most
“notable.”) See Ten Notable Pre-1923 Recordings, ASS’N FOR RECORDED SOUND
COLLECTIONS, http://www.arsc-audio.org/publicdomainpre23.html [https://perma.cc/2ZJRADS5].
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The “transition periods” are not the only differences between federal
copyright protection and the sui generis protection provided by § 1401. For
example, those familiar with copyright law know that a plaintiff cannot
recover statutory damages or attorney’s fees unless it has registered the
copyright before the infringement commenced (or, for infringement of a
published work, within ninety days of first publication).149 Because § 1401
does not give pre-1972 sound recordings a federal copyright, those sound
recordings cannot be registered in the usual manner. Thus, the CPA
provides that section 412 does not apply.150 Instead, the CPA provides for a
“filing requirement” to permit a rights owner to recover statutory damages
and attorney’s fees. Under the CPA, “an award of statutory damages or of
attorneys’ fees . . . may be made with respect to an unauthorized use of a
[pre-1972] sound recording . . . only if (I) the rights owner has filed with the
Copyright Office a schedule that specifies the title, artist, and rights owner
of the sound recording”; and (II) the use occurs more than 90 days after that
information “is indexed into the public records of the Copyright Office.”151
The initial rights owner of the pre-1972 sound recording is
determined by state law, as it existed before the date of enactment.152
Unlike copyright owners, rights owners do not have to register (or file a
schedule) with the Copyright Office before filing an action for a violation of
§ 1401.153 If the pre-1972 sound recording “is not being commercially
exploited by or under the authority of the rights owner,” a person who has
made a reasonable, good faith search for the sound recording without
success,154 and who satisfies certain procedural prerequisites,155 may make a
noncommercial use of the pre-1972 sound recording.156 There is no similar
149

17 U.S.C. § 412 (2018).
Id. § 1401(f)(5)(C).
151
Id. § 1401(f)(5)(A)(i). The CPA also contains an alternative limitation on statutory
damages and attorneys’ fees that depends both on action by the transmitting entity and
inaction by the rights owner. Id. § 1401(f)(5)(B). Apparently, the alternative limitation was
intended as a transitional measure that would only apply during the first 180 days after
enactment. S. REP. NO. 115-339, at 19 (2018). Because of the way the statute is worded,
however, it appears that the alternative applies to any “transmitting entity” that filed its
contact information with the Copyright Office during the 180-day period. Id.
152
17 U.S.C. § 1401(l)(2)(A) (2018). Transfers occurring after the date of enactment,
however, are governed by sections 201(d) and (e) and section 204 of the Copyright Act. Id.
§§ 1401(h)(1)(A), 1401(l)(2)(B). Section 204 requires that any transfers of an exclusive
right must be made in a writing signed by the transferor. Id. § 204(a).
153
Id. § 1401(h)(1)(B).
154
Id. § 1401(c)(1)(A).
155
Id. § 1401(c)(1)(B) (filing of notice of intended use with the Copyright Office); id. §
1401(c)(1)(C) (rights owner does not object within 90 days after the notice is indexed).
156
Id. § 1401(c)(1).
150
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exception for copyrighted works (including “restored works”), although the
person could argue that such a “noncommercial” use should be considered a
fair use.157
Finally, under § 108(h), a library or archives may reproduce and use
a copyrighted work “for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research”
during the last twenty years of its term,158 if the work is not being commercially exploited, and a copy or phonorecord cannot be obtained at a
reasonable price.159 For pre-1972 sound recordings, however, this exception
for use by libraries and archives applies during the entire remaining term of
protection.160

V. RECONCILING COPYRIGHT RESTORATION WITH SUI GENERIS PROTECTION
All sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, are eligible for
the sui generis protection provided by § 1401, while only certain pre-1972
sound recordings of foreign origin qualified for a so-called “restored”
copyright under § 104A. As noted above, the major differences between the
two types of protection are duration (term of protection), formalities (filing
and registration requirements), and the exceptions for noncommercial use of
orphan works and uses by libraries and archives.
As a result of these differences, the question naturally arises: under
current law, do pre-1972 sound recordings of foreign origin receive
protection only under § 104A, only under § 1401, or under both statutes?
The answer to this question is surprisingly unclear. There are legitimate
textual arguments that can be made in favor of all three alternatives.

Under 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2018), a use “for nonprofit educational purposes” is more
likely to be a fair use than a use “of a commercial nature,” but that is only one factor to be
considered, and a court might well interpret “noncommercial” use under § 1401 differently
(more broadly) than “nonprofit educational” use under § 107.
158
Id. § 108(h)(1).
159
Id. § 108(h)(2) (A)–(B).
160
Id. § 1401(f)(1)(B).
157
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A. Option A: Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Are Protected Only Under
Section 1401
One can argue that Congress intended the sui generis protection for
pre-1972 sound recordings to repeal and replace the copyright protection
that a limited subset of those recordings previously enjoyed under § 104A.
The argument for this option is the text of § 301(c), as amended by the
Classics Protection and Access Act: “Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 303, and in accordance with chapter 14, no sound recording fixed
before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title.”161
In other words, even if a pre-1972 sound recording previously had a federal
statutory copyright under § 104A, that federal statutory copyright has now
been replaced by the protection provided “in accordance with chapter 14.”
Section 303 provides the copyright term for “a work created before
January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the public domain or
copyrighted.”162 Sound recordings that were fixed before February 15,
1972, were not “copyrighted” before January 1, 1978, because such
recordings were not eligible for copyright; and they were not “in the public
domain” before January 1, 1978, because they had protection against
reproduction and distribution under state law. Thus, in the absence of §
301(c), any pre-1972 sound recordings that had copyright protection under
§ 104A would be entitled to the term provided in § 303. Under this
interpretation, § 301(c) makes it clear that pre-1972 sound recordings do not
get the term of protection provided for in § 303. Instead, they get the term
of protection provided for in § 1401.
Nonetheless, there are objections to this interpretation. In particular,
except for the reference to § 1401, the same language has been part of Title
17 since the 1976 Copyright Act came into effect, on January 1, 1978. At
that time, § 301(a) read:
With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15,
1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or
statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this
title until February 15, 2047. The preemptive provisions of
161

Id. § 301(c) (emphasis added).
Id. § 303(a). The vast majority of such works were works created before January 1,
1978, but not published or registered as unpublished works before that date. Such works
had been protected by state law (so-called common-law copyright) before January 1, 1978.
On that date, the common-law copyright in such works was preempted by § 301(a) and
replaced with a federal statutory copyright.
162
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subsection (a) shall apply to . . . any cause of action arising
from undertakings commenced on and after February 15,
2047. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 303, no
sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be
subject to copyright under this title before, on, or after
February 15, 2047.

At that time, the meaning was clear: sound recordings fixed on or after
February 15, 1972, got a federal statutory copyright, while sound recordings
fixed before February 15,1972, did not get a federal copyright and were
protected only by state law and only until February 15, 2047 (75 years after
1972). On that day, all state-law protection for pre-1972 sound recordings
would be preempted, and those recordings would enter the public domain.
When copyright restoration was enacted in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA) on December 8, 1994, § 301(c) was not amended;
it still contained exactly the same language. Nonetheless, several canons of
statutory interpretation suggest that amended § 104A took precedence of the
holdover language of § 301(c). First, a newly enacted statute generally takes
precedence over an older one.163 Second, a specific statute (here, a statute
concerning some pre-1972 sound recordings of foreign origin) usually takes
precedence over a general one (here, one that applied to pre-1972 sound
recordings generally).164 Third, if § 301(c) took precedence over § 104A, it
would have rendered the newly enacted provision concerning “sound
recordings fixed before February 15, 1972” superfluous, and an
interpretation that renders a statute superfluous is to be avoided, if
possible.165 (Conversely, giving precedence to § 104A would not have
rendered § 301(c) wholly superfluous, because § 301(c) still applied to
sound recordings that were not of foreign origin.)
Consequently, it seems clear that the language of § 301(a) did not
prevent those foreign sound recordings that qualified under § 104A from
“If the new provisions and the . . . unchanged portions of the original section cannot be
harmonized, the new provisions should prevail as the latest declaration of legislative will.”
1A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 22:34 (7th ed. 2021) [hereinafter SINGER & SINGER].
164
“[I]f two statutes or provisions conflict, the general statute or provision must yield to the
specific statute or provision involving the same subject.” Id. § 46.5.
165
“Courts should construe a statute, if possible, so no term is rendered superfluous or
meaningless.” Id. § 21:1. See also Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub.
Co., 747 F.3d 673, 681 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We should not adopt an interpretation of a
congressional enactment which renders superfluous another portion of that same law.”)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
163
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receiving a federal statutory “copyright under this title.” If that was the case,
why should we not continue to interpret § 301(c) in the same way? Section
301(c) was amended in 1998 to extend the date of federal preemption to
February 15, 2067 (ninety-five years after 1972), but the language
otherwise remained the same. No one argued at the time that the
amendment somehow divested pre-1972 foreign sound recordings of their
copyrights. If that was true in 1998, why would it not be true today?
The response is that the canons of statutory interpretation no longer
point in the same direction. In 2018, § 301(c) was amended by the Classics
Protection and Access Act, the same statute that enacted § 1401. Since a
newly enacted statute generally takes precedence over an older one, there is
now a much stronger argument that amended § 301(c) took away or
divested the federal statutory copyrights of foreign sound recordings and
replaced them with the sui generis protection provided “in accordance with
chapter 14.” Granted, the second canon (the specific takes precedence over
the general) still points in the other direction; but the counter to that canon
is that there is no longer any good reason to treat foreign pre-1972 sound
recordings differently from domestic pre-1972 sound recordings. In 1994,
Congress was trying to comply with Article 18 of the Berne Convention,
which applies only to foreign works, while leaving the status quo unaltered
for domestic works. A distinction between foreign and domestic sound
recordings makes sense in that context. In 2018, however, Congress was
trying to give sui generis protection to pre-1972 sound recordings that
would be similar to the copyright protection already provided to 1972-andlater sound recordings. Although some pre-1972 recordings of foreign
origin already had a federal statutory copyright, in this context Congress
plausibly might have thought it made more sense to treat all pre-1972 sound
recordings the same, rather than distinguishing on the basis of domestic or
foreign origin.166
The third canon also carries less weight than before. In 1994, it was
the newly enacted provision on pre-1972 sound recordings that would have
been rendered superfluous by the holdover language of § 301(c), and it
would have left those foreign sound recordings with no protection
whatsoever. Today, however, a provision that is more than two decades old
would be rendered superfluous by the newly amended language of § 301(c);
See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 163, § 51:5 (“[I]f two statutes conflict, the general
statute must yield to the specific statute involving the same subject, regardless of whether it
was passed prior to the general statute, unless the legislature intended to make the general
act controlling, [or] the general act deals comprehensively with [the] subject . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
166
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and it would be replaced with sui generis protection that is nearly (but not
quite) identical to the existing copyright that is being divested. The
argument is that Congress impliedly repealed a single clause in § 104A and
replaced it with the sui generis protection of § 1401.167
It’s a nice argument, but there are two additional objections. First,
there is not a single indication anywhere in the legislative history that
Congress even thought about the existing copyrights that certain foreign
sound recordings enjoyed, one way or the other. Second, when enacting
new provisions relating to copyright over the years, Congress has gone to
great lengths to avoid due process problems by preserving the status quo
while legislating prospectively only.168 The notion that Congress would
simply repeal and replace entire category of property rights without clearly
saying so, and with no indication that it gave the matter careful thought,
should give one pause. Nonetheless, the express language of § 301(c)
certainly makes this option a plausible interpretation.
B. Option B: Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Are Protected Under
Section 1401, Which Supplements the Protection Granted to Foreign Sound
Recordings Under Section 104A
The argument that both statutes apply is that Congress did not repeal
or amend § 104A when it enacted § 1401 in the Classics Protection and
Access Act. Nothing in the new statute expressly says that it limits or
divests the “restored” copyrights that already existed. Under this
interpretation, the amended language of § 301(c) simply carries forward the
old language without substantive change, adding an acknowledgement of
the newly enacted § 1401, but without intending to limit, divest, or repeal
any existing copyright protection.169
See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 163, § 22:22 (“Repeal by implication occurs when an
act not purporting to repeal any prior act is wholly or partially inconsistent with a prior
statute, or covers the subject of a prior act or section and is a substitute act. The latest
declaration of the legislature prevails. The inconsistent provisions of the prior statute . . .
are treated as repealed.”) (emphasis added).
168
For example, in enacting § 104A, Congress included provisions to ensure the rights of
so-called “reliance parties,” those who were using the work in reliance on its former public
domain status. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(c), (d)(2)–(4), (h)(4) (2018). Cf. SINGER & SINGER, supra
note 163, § 40:20 (“[M]ost statutes relating to property are carefully drafted to apply only
to future property interests, thus avoiding a denial of due process.”).
169
This appears to be the position of the U.S. Copyright Office. See Noncommercial Use of
Pre-1972 Sound Recordings that Are Not Being Commercially Exploited, 84 Fed. Reg.
14,242, 14,250 (Apr. 9, 2019) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201) (“[S]ection 1401
provides sui generis protection running parallel to any copyright protection afforded to
foreign Pre-1972 Sound Recordings under section 104A.”).
167
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This interpretation is supported by the fact that there is nothing in
the legislative history that suggests that Congress intended to divest,
remove, or replace any existing copyrights on pre-1972 sound recordings.170
Moreover, “[c]opyrights are a form of property,”171 so that taking away
existing copyright protection from pre-1972 sound recordings might be a
“taking” of property that violates the Fifth Amendment.172
While a full analysis of the takings issue is beyond the scope of this
article, there are substantial reasons to question whether the 2018 Act
should be considered a “taking.” A “taking” of private property occurs only
if there is a complete “appropriation” of property, or if a regulation deprives
the owner of all economically beneficial use of his or her property;174 and
such a “taking” violates the Constitution only if there is no “just
compensation.”175 Even if we assume that the CPA deprived the owners of
foreign pre-1972 sound recordings of their existing copyright protection, the
same legislation provided significant “compensation” in the form of
§ 1401.176 Section 1401 provides the same exclusive rights that copyright
173

170

Noncommercial Use of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings that Are Not Being Commercially
Exploited, 84 Fed. Reg. 1661, 1670 (Feb. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201)
(“[S]ection 1401 and the legislative history do not reference foreign recordings specifically,
or refer to or revise section 104A, and there is no evidence of congressional intent to extinguish copyright protection granted to foreign Pre-1972 Sound Recordings under section
104A.”).
171
Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020).
172
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”).
173
For discussions of takings jurisprudence as applied to copyrights and patents, see, e.g.,
Note, Copyright Reform and the Takings Clause, 128 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2015); Adam
Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents
Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007); Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property
Is Created Equal: Why Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why
They Are Right To Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2007); Shubha Ghosh, Toward a
Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path Left Open After College
Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000); Thomas F. Cotter, Do
Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529
(1998); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The
Sovereign's Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685 (1989).
174
See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2017); Jim Olive Photography v. Univ.
of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 771–72 (Tex. 2021).
175
Jim Olive, 624 S.W.3d at 771.
176
Cf. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Takings Clause
does not apply to patents because 28 U.S.C. §1498(a) provides a remedy for government
use), vacated on reh’g, 672 F.3d 1309, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (declining to reach
the issue).
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protection does: reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, and public
performance by means of digital audio transmission.177 The filing
requirements of § 1401 are less onerous than the comparable registration
requirements applicable to ordinary copyrights.178 Section 1401 is subject to
a special exception for “noncommercial use” of orphan works, but only if
the owner does not object in writing after receiving constructive notice of
the use.179 Thus, the major difference between copyright protection under §
104A and sui generis protection under § 1401 is the term of protection.
Section 104A provides that restored copyrights “shall subsist for the
remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have otherwise been
granted in the United States if the work never entered the public domain in
the United States.”180 As noted above, the term of protection for most
restored sound recordings is ninety-five years from the date of first
publication.181 In all cases, the term of protection under § 1401 is equal to
or longer than ninety-five years. The extra duration (the “transition
periods”) could be considered “compensation” for the substitution of sui
generis protection for federal copyright protection. Thus, in most cases it is
unlikely that substituting § 1401 for a “restored” copyright would be a Fifth
Amendment violation.182
There might be one conflict that could produce a takings clause
violation, however: ownership. Section 104A provides that initial ownership is “determined by the law of the source country of the work.”183
Section 1401, by contrast, specifies that initial ownership is to be determined “under the law of any State, as of the day before the date of
enactment of this section.”184 Although the reference to “the law of any
State” could be interpreted broadly enough to include foreign states as well
177

17 U.S.C. § 1401 (2018). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text.
179
17 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2018).
180
17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B) (2018).
181
See supra Part III.C.
182
If, however, the substitution resulted in a shortening of the copyright term (as would be
the case for some unpublished pre-1972 sound recordings of foreign origin), that would
likely violate the Takings Clause. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 226 (2003)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a patent, the
Government . . . sought to modify the bargain by shortening the term of the patent in order
to accelerate public access to the invention. The fairness considerations that underlie [our]
constitutional protections . . . would presumably disable Congress from making such a
retroactive change in the public’s bargain with an inventor without providing compensation
for the taking.”).
183
17 U.S.C. § 104A(b) (2018).
184
Id. § 1401(l)(2)(A).
178
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as domestic ones, that interpretation is extremely dubious.185 If State law
and foreign law were in conflict, then substituting § 1401 for § 104A might
result in a change of ownership of the rights in the sound recording, which
very likely would be a Takings Clause violation.186 The author suspects this
is more of a theoretical possibility than a real one, as most states’ choice-oflaw provisions would likely point to the law of a foreign country for works
first fixed or first published in a foreign country.187 Nonetheless, even the
possibility that a foreign rightsholder might be divested of his or her
copyright argues in favor of overlapping protection, which could be owned
by different parties.

Section 101 provides that the word “State” “includes the District of Columbia and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territories to which this title is made applicable by
an Act of Congress.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). Although section 101 also says that the term
“including” is “inclusive and not limitative,” id., the primary use of the word “State” in the
Copyright Act is the provision that (unsuccessfully) attempted to waive the sovereign
immunity of “[a]ny State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity.” 17 U.S.C. § 511(a)
(2018) (held unconstitutional in Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020)). Given that
Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2018), a
special statute governing the sovereign immunity of “a foreign state,” in the same year that
it enacted the Copyright Act, it is extremely unlikely that Congress intended the capitalized
term “State” to include foreign states.
186
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t has long been
accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2018) (“When an individual author’s ownership of a copyright, or
of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously transferred voluntarily .
. . , no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to
seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title.”);
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 163, § 41:6 (“Courts frequently state that a statute cannot
have retroactive application where that would interfere with, impair, or divest vested
rights.”).
187
See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir.
1998) (“[T]he usual rule is that the interests of the parties in property are determined by the
law of the state with the most significant relationship to the property and the parties.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (applying Russian law to determine
ownership of copyright in works first published in Russia, even though the alleged
infringement occurred in the United States). Cf. CAL. CIV. CODE § 946 (West 2022) (“If
there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed
to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.”); Cairns v.
Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying the law of Great
Britain to a right of publicity claim by the estate of Diana, Princess of Wales).
185
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C. Option C: Foreign Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Are Protected
Only Under Section 104A, Because Section 1401 Applies Only to Domestic
Pre-1972 Sound Recordings
Finally, there is also a textual argument that the two statutes do not
overlap at all, because § 104A only applies to pre-1972 sound recording of
foreign origin, while newly enacted § 1401 only applies to pre-1972 sound
recordings for domestic origin.
The case for non-overlap of protection relies on the fact that
Congress carefully specified exactly which sections of the Copyright Act
would also apply to § 1401 and excluded all others. For example, § 1401
provides that pre-1972 sound recordings are subject to the exceptions and
limitations in § 107 (fair use), § 108 (libraries and archives), § 109 (firstsale doctrine), § 110 (public performances), and § 112(f) (ephemeral copies
for governmental bodies and nonprofit educational institutions).188 Section
1401 is also subject to the exception in § 114(d)(1) (FCC-licensed over-theair transmissions) and the compulsory license in § 112(e) and § 114(d)(2)
(subscription transmissions and webcasting).189 Congress also specified that
§ 1401 was subject to § 507 (statute of limitations)190 and § 512 (safe
harbors for online service providers).191 Finally, the definitions of § 101
apply to § 1401.192
To emphasize that only these sections apply to § 1401, Congress
expressly provided that “no provision of this title shall apply to or limit the
remedies available under this section except as otherwise provided in this
section.”193
Among the “provision[s] of this title” that do not apply to § 1401 are
§ 104 and § 104A. Section 104 defines the “national origin” of works
eligible for protection. Unpublished works “are subject to protection under
this title without regard to the nationality or domicile of the author.”194
Published works are “subject to protection under this title” if “one or more
of the authors is a national or domiciliary of the United States, or . . . of a
treaty party,”195 or if “the work is first published in the United States or in a
188

17 U.S.C. § 1401(f)(1)(A) (2018).
Id. § 1401(b).
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Id. § 1401(f)(2).
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193
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foreign nation that, on the date of first publication, is a treaty party.”196 A
sound recording is also protected if it “was first fixed” in a “treaty party.”197
A treaty party is a nation with whom the United States has entered into an
“international agreement” concerning copyright.198
Because § 104 is not identified as one of the sections that apply to §
1401, and because “no provision of this title shall apply to or limit the
remedies available under this section except as otherwise provided in this
section[,]”199 the conclusion is that § 104 does not apply to § 1401. That
could mean that pre-1972 sound recordings are protected without regard to
national origin at all, (i.e., that it doesn’t matter where the recordings were
published or first fixed). But there is a presumption that Congress intends to
legislate only within the borders of the United States unless the statute
clearly indicates otherwise.200 Consequently, one could conclude that §
1401 only applies to pre-1972 sound recordings that were fixed or first
published in the United States. In other words, sound recordings that were
fixed and first published outside the United States aren’t governed by §
1401 at all.
Under this interpretation, there is no overlap: domestic sound
recordings are governed only by § 1401, and foreign sound recordings are
governed (if at all) only by § 104A. But this interpretation has several
drawbacks. The first drawback is a textual one: § 1401 does not say that §
104 and § 104A do not apply at all; it says that they do not “apply to or
limit the remedies available under this section.”201 Moreover, this language
is contained in § 1401(f), which is titled “Limitations on remedies.”202
Together, this suggests that Congress was trying to be expansive by
avoiding limits on the remedies available for a violation of § 1401, rather
than intentionally imposing a domestic restriction on a section that
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Id. § 1401(f)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
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have no force beyond its boundaries.”); WesternGeco, LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138
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otherwise would apply to the use of domestic and foreign sound recordings
alike.
Second, this interpretation possibly leaves a lacuna: foreign sound
recordings that do not qualify under § 104A are left uncovered by either
statutory regime. Given that the purpose of Congress was to grant federal
protection to pre-1972 sound recordings that would be equivalent to the
copyright protection given to later sound recordings,203 and that copyright
applies to both domestic and foreign sound recordings,204 it seems unlikely
that Congress would have excluded foreign copyrights from what was
presumably intended to be a comprehensive system.
Third, this interpretation would violate the principle of “national
treatment,” which is an important principle in international intellectual
property agreements.205 The principle of national treatment is a nondiscrimination principle: it provides that a nation must treat foreign
nationals no less favorably than it treats its own nationals.206 Although the
Berne Convention does not apply to sound recordings,207 both the TRIPS
Agreement and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty promise
national treatment with regard to sound recordings.208 This principle would
be violated if the U.S. granted domestic owners of pre-1972 sound
recordings more favorable treatment than foreign owners of pre-1972 sound
recordings. There is an exception to national treatment in the Berne
Convention known as the “rule of the shorter term”: if the source country of
203

See Classics Protection and Access Act, COPYRIGHT.GOV,
https://www.copyright.gov/music-modernization/pre1972-soundrecordings/
[https://perma.cc/7882-PBSW] (“The new law also applies a statutory licensing regime
similar to that which applies to post-1972 sound recordings, e.g., the statutory licenses for
non-interactive digital streaming services, including Internet radio, satellite radio, and cable
TV music services.”).
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17 U.S.C. § 104(b) (2018).
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Rome Convention. See Rome Convention, supra note 43, arts. 2, 4, 5(1), 6(1).
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See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy, in respect of
works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other
than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
grant to their nationals . . . .”).
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See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
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TRIPS Agreement, supra note 36, art. 3(1) (“Each Member shall accord to the nationals
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the work has a shorter term of copyright than the country in which
protection is sought, the latter country may elect to use the shorter term for
works from the source country, instead of the longer term that it grants to
domestic works.209 However, the rule of the shorter term only applies to
works covered by the Berne Convention; there is no similar exception for
sound recordings in either TRIPS or the WPPT.210 Thus, this interpretation
would violate the canon of statutory construction that “an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains.”211 As a result, this interpretation is the least
likely to be adopted by a court.
D. Choosing the Best Option
As we have seen, the answer to the overlap (and potential conflict)
between § 104A and § 1401 cannot be answered by the text alone. There are
plausible textual interpretations supporting all three options. It cannot be
answered by reference to the legislative history, which is devoid of any
mention of sound recordings of foreign origin at all. Instead, the question
must be resolved by the slipperiest of interpretive instruments: public
policy. Which interpretation best complies with the supposed “intent” of
Congress, to the extent it can be gleaned from the breadcrumbs that
Congress has provided?
Owners or rightholders of foreign pre-1972 sound recordings will
certainly argue in favor of overlapping protection (Option B). That way, the
foreign rightholder would get the protection of a federal copyright during
the initial ninety-five-year term of protection, and they would get the
benefit of sui generis protection during the remaining “transition period”
provided by § 1401. This solution is even more preferable if there is more
than a theoretical possibility that the initial rightholder under foreign law is
different from the initial domestic rightholder under State law: the former
would be entitled to the protection of a federal copyright, while the latter
would be entitled only to sui generis protection. Although it is highly
unlikely that Congress even considered the possibility that a State might
grant rights in a sound recording of foreign origin to someone other than the
Berne Convention, supra note 38, art. 7(8) (“[T]he term shall be governed by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of
that country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of
origin of the work.”).
210
The WPPT lists only one exception to the principle of national treatment, in article 4(2),
which implies there are no other exceptions.
211
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
209
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foreign rightholder, certainly if it had considered such a scenario it would
have wanted to avoid the possibility of a due process violation.
But other than the possibility of a conflict of ownership, it seems
much cleaner to simply treat all pre-1972 sound recordings under a single
sui generis statutory regime (Option A), rather than continuing to recognize
a statutory copyright in qualifying sound recordings of foreign origin. One
can argue that if a rightholder wants to benefit from the extended “transition
period” under § 1401, it ought to have to relinquish its claim to a statutory
copyright. This solution also better fits with the amended text of § 301(c),
which otherwise has to be ignored.
Even if both statutes are deemed to apply (Option B), the remedies
provided for their violation are the same, except there are no criminal
penalties for violations of § 1401.212 It is highly unlikely that Congress
intended duplicative remedies under two different statutory regimes (except
perhaps in the unlikely case that there were different rightholders under
state law and foreign law). If faced with overlapping claims by a single
rightholder, at a minimum a court should hold that the rightholder may
recover only a single monetary award, and not double damages and profits.
There is no good reason to believe that Congress intended to provide
duplicative remedies to the owners of pre-1972 sound recordings of foreign
origin.213

VI. CONCLUSION
How likely is this issue to arise in real life? If a defendant tries to
take advantage of the exception for noncommercial use of an orphan work
in § 1401(c), in theory a foreign rightholder with a “restored” copyright
could argue that there is no such exception for copyrighted works. The
defendant would argue for Option A, while the rightholder would win under
Options B or C. By definition, however, such a case would only arise if the
defendant had made a good-faith effort to locate the rightholder and failed,
and the rightholder did not learn about the proposed use until more than
See 17 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (2018) (stating that violators “shall be subject to the
remedies provided in sections 502 through 505 . . . to the same extent as an infringer of
copyright”).
213
One could argue, however, that this would explain the otherwise cryptic language in
subsection 1401 that “no provision of this title [including section 104A] shall apply to or
limit the remedies available under this section except as otherwise provided in this
section.” Id. § 1401(f)(6)(A) (emphasis added).
212
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ninety days after the defendant’s notice of intention was indexed in the
records of the Copyright Office.214 Such a convoluted situation seems
highly unlikely to arise.
Similarly, a library or archives might decide to reproduce, distribute,
or perform a foreign pre-1972 sound recordings “for purposes of
preservation, scholarship, or research” under the exception in § 108(h).215
For a copyrighted work, this exception only applies during the last twenty
years of its term;216 but for the sui generis protection for pre-1972 sound
recordings, it applies during the entire remaining term,217 which could be up
to forty-five years. If the issue arose before the last twenty years of the term,
again the defendant (the library or archives) would argue for Option A, and
the rightholder would argue for Options B or C. This exemption does not
apply, however, if “the work is subject to normal commercial
exploitation”218 or if “a copy or phonorecord of the work can be obtained at
a reasonable price.”219 If neither of those things are true, it seems unlikely a
rightholder would object to the premature invocation of this exception.
The issue is somewhat more likely to arise during the “transition
period” for a foreign pre-1972 sound recording. If a defendant wanted to
avoid paying royalties during the transition period, it could try to argue that
the copyright protection provided in § 104A had expired, and that there was
no overlap in protection under Option C. The rightholder would then
respond that it is entitled to royalties under either Option A or Option B.
But given that there is a compulsory license for the public performance of
sound recordings by means of digital audio transmission,220 it is unlikely
that a defendant would object to paying royalties for the public performance
of such a work. A conflict would more likely arise if a defendant wanted to
reproduce and sell copies of the recording. Given the movement of the
music world to digital streaming, one suspects it would have to be a foreign
sound recording that is uniquely valuable.
Thus, it is entirely possible that the issue will never be litigated. If
so, this article will remain a purely intellectual exercise. Nonetheless, the
214
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possibility of future litigation should not entirely be ignored. The best
solution would be for Congress to expressly consider the issue and decide
which of the three options it deems best from a public policy perspective.
(The author’s preference is for Option A, but I can understand how
constitutional concerns might lead Congress to adopt Option B.) Absent a
Congressional fix, if the issue does arise, the author hopes that this article
will provide guidance to the unfortunate litigants who find themselves in the
position of having to navigate this exceedingly complex labyrinth of
statutory interpretation.

